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Rwanda’s Use of Transitional Justice After 
Genocide: The Gacaca Courts and the ICTR* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Between April 6 and July 4 of 1994, an estimated 800,000 to 
1,000,000 citizens of Rwanda were massacred in an ethnically motivated 
genocide.1  In the aftermath of the civil war, this small African country 
was left not only with extensive physical and psychological scarring, but 
also the realization that countless ordinary Rwandan citizens were highly 
involved in the genocide.2  In the words of President Paul Kagame, “[t]he 
genocide touched the lives of all Rwandans; no individual or community 
was spared.  Every Rwandan is either a genocide survivor or a 
perpetrator, or the friend or relative of a survivor or perpetrator.”3 
Immediately following the genocide, the Rwandan government 
began imprisoning suspected participants.4  By May 28, 1995, the 
Rwandan government “stopped arresting all but the most serious 
suspects” due to extreme overcrowding in the prisons that caused 
prisoners to suffocate.5  Approximately 120,000 people were in prison by 
1996.6  By 1999, the sheer number of suspects imprisoned made apparent 
that Rwanda’s civil courts could not expeditiously adjudicate genocide 
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 1. See, e.g., Bert Ingelaere, The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND 
RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 25, 25 (Luc 
Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008) (stating that “approximately 800,000 people died”); Paul Kagame, 
Preface to AFTER GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND 
RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND BEYOND, at xxi, xxi (Phil Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman eds., 
2008) (stating that “an estimated one million people were murdered”). 
 2. Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 30. 
 3. Kagame, supra note 1, at xxi. 
 4. See Rwanda Suspends Arrests, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 28, 1995, at A5. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Arthur Baguma, Traditional Courts Provides Solution to Genocide Cases, NEW VISION 
(Uganda), Aug. 13, 2008. 
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cases.7  In fact, by 1999, courts had only tried 5000 of 120,000 suspects.8  
At this rate, it would take over a century to try all the cases.9  
Additionally, as recognized by former Rwandan President Pasteur 
Bizimungu, the people and government of Rwanda faced a dilemma—
they truly needed an alternative form of justice, something more efficient 
and comprehensive than traditional criminal justice.10 
The solution to the problem: transitional justice.  The term 
“transitional justice,” as used in this Comment, describes a combination 
of both backward- and forward-looking elements—namely, “the 
conception of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of 
repressive predecessor regimes”11 and recognized postconflict strategies 
that focus on the “rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of the 
society”12 and “reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a 
functioning peacetime society in the economy and society.”13  “Conflict 
management and, where possible, reconciliation are threads that must run 
through this framework to achieve a sustainable result.”14 
Out of this comprehensive need for transitional justice, the current 
gacaca court system was born.  During the same time, the United Nations 
formed its own answer to the Rwandan Genocide, known as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  Each system has its 
own vast strengths and weaknesses.  As will be discussed in this 
Comment, however, the gacaca courts are more effective in terms of 
giving the people of Rwanda the transitional justice they need.  This 
Comment will show the strength of the gacaca courts by examining 
economic, psychological, sociological, and cultural considerations.  The 
gacaca courts prevail over the ICTR as a mode of transitional justice not 
only because of successes in these areas but also because the ICTR has 
failed to strike the appropriate balance between the local culture and the 
international tribunal. 
                                                     
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Genocide Conference in Kigali: President says “Alternative Forms of Justice” Needed 
to Deal with Genocide (Radio Rwanda radio broadcast Nov. 2, 1995) (reported by 
BBC Summary of the World Broadcasts). 
 11. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003). 
 12. WORLD BANK, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 14 box 
1 (1998). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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Additionally, this Comment analyzes the gacaca courts at a critical 
time, as they recently completed the last of their trials, and the ICTR will 
dissolve at the end of its cases.  Thus, questions will emerge regarding 
whether either the gacaca courts or the ICTR should be deemed a 
success.  Further, if something similar to gacaca is used in the future in 
place of an international tribunal, certain issues of legitimacy will need to 
be addressed, such as screening of judges and protection of witnesses.  
This Comment begins with a brief history of Rwanda, followed by 
descriptions of both the current gacaca courts and the ICTR.  Next, the 
Comment addresses the strengths and weaknesses of each system, as 
well as the usefulness of the gacaca courts as a tool to view legal 
responses in a potentially different and more comprehensive way. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. A Brief History of Rwanda 
The history of Rwanda is important both in understanding how a 
genocide could occur and where the concept of the postgenocide gacaca 
system arose.  Therefore, the best place to start is with the history of 
Rwanda and its people and then move to the events that sparked the 1994 
genocide. 
Accounts of Rwandan history are somewhat varied.  Rwanda is 
historically an agricultural society where the paramount social 
organization consisted of the family unit.15  In the precolonial period, 
“gacaca” was a gathering of respected community elders used for 
preserving peace and harmony in the community.16  These meetings were 
traditionally held on the lawn, giving the gacaca court its name—gacaca 
means “small grass.”17  This is why the gacaca court is often referred to 
as “justice on the grass.”18  The meetings adjudicated familial and 
community disputes, including land ownership and use, property 
damage, cattle ownership, inheritance, and marriage.19  This adjudication 
process allowed individuals and families to resolve their disputes; for 
example, injured parties could receive apologies, compensation, or both 
                                                     
 15. See Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 26, 33. 
 16. See Baguma, supra note 6. 
 17. Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional 
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 48 (2006). 
 18. Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 33. 
 19. Annet Birungi, Restorative Justice Is the Only Way to Reconciliation, NEW TIMES 
(Rwanda), May 11, 2005. 
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for loss from the wrongdoer.20  Gacaca also sanctioned community-rule 
violations and fostered reconciliation by restoring harmony and social 
order and reintegrating the person who caused the disruption.21 
Other areas of Rwandan history are more difficult to understand.  
The genocide in Rwanda was part of a civil war between two ethnic 
groups—the Hutu and the Tutsi.22  The most difficult part of Rwandan 
history to discern is exactly how the Hutu and Tutsi came to be two 
ethnically separated groups.  The current Rwandan government 
emphasizes a unified Rwanda.23  Thus, its version of precolonial history 
stresses that the Hutu and Tutsi were not originally separate racial 
categories but instead were socio-economic classes; the racial 
stratification was constructed for the convenience of Belgian 
colonizers.24  Other readings of history stress the distinctness of the two 
groups—for example, that they migrated to Rwanda at separate times 
from separate racial and geographic areas; or, that they were separated 
initially by livelihood—the Hutu as agriculturalists and the Tutsi as 
pastoralists.25 
Rwanda was colonized by Germany in 1897; then Belgium acquired 
control in 1919.26  Unfortunately, Belgian colonization twisted Rwanda’s 
social and judicial dynamics.  The Belgians classified the Rwandan 
people into two groups—the ruling Tutsi and the inferior Hutu.27  Thus, 
ethnicity became institutionalized under Belgian/Tutsi rule.28  Even 
though the Belgian colonizers introduced a western-style legal system, 
the gacaca court system remained in place as a lower level, subservient 
judicial process used to resolve local problems without involving 
colonial authorities.29  Because the Western system was imposed over the 
traditional institution, the legitimacy of the gacaca courts diminished.30 
                                                     
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See NICHOLAS A. JONES, THE COURTS OF GENOCIDE: POLITICS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN 
RWANDA AND ARUSHA 6–7 (2010). 
 23. See Rosemary Nagy, Traditional Justice and Legal Pluralism in Transitional Context: The 
Case of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, in RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 86, 88 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009). 
 24. See Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 26. 
 25. Id.  The separation, however it occurred, is dissolving under the government in modern 
Rwanda.  See Nagy, supra note 23, at 88. 
 26. Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 26. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 34. 
 30. Id. 
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In 1959, the “Hutu revolution” began, which had the effect of putting 
the Tutsi in the inferior social position.31  In the following years, Tutsi 
rulers were ejected from their communities amid violence and sought 
refuge in neighboring countries.32  The Tutsi regrouped and attacked 
Rwanda in 1963 through 1964, but many were killed or forced back out 
of the country.33  In 1962, Grégoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, became 
Rwanda’s first President.34  President Kayibanda and his successor, 
President Habyarimana, sought to reverse the Belgian policies by 
elevating the Hutu to power and making the Tutsi the inferior class.35 
In 1990, the Tutsi-based Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked 
Rwanda.36  This attack sparked years of civil turmoil.  President 
Habyarimana’s single political party had been carefully erected to 
maintain the status quo; as a result, the country fell into violence as a 
way of politics, generally targeting the Tutsi for being of the same ethnic 
identity as the rebel force.37  The Hutu government began distributing 
weapons to local communities.38  Propaganda appeared that characterized 
the Tutsi as cockroaches and a threat to the Hutu majority, and the slogan 
“Hutu pawa”—Hutu power—spread through the country.39  When 
President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6, 1994, the 
state-driven genocide campaign began.40  The militia, army, police 
forces, and state personnel drove the killings and incited locals to turn on 
their neighbors to cleanse the country of the Tutsi threat and maintain 
Hutu power.41  Ultimately, the 100-day genocide left approximately 
800,000 dead.42 
After the genocide, the government imprisoned approximately 
120,000 suspects.43  The government-run civil judicial system had not 
escaped decimation by the war and could not adjudicate its caseload.44  
                                                     
 31. See id. at 27. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Linda Melvern, The Past Is Prologue: Planning the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, in AFTER 
GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN 
RWANDA AND BEYOND, supra note 1, at 21, 23. 
 37. Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 28–29. 
 38. Melvern, supra note 36, at 24–25. 
 39. Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 29. 
 40. See id. at 25. 
 41. Id. at 29–30. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Baguma, supra note 6. 
 44. See JONES, supra note 22, at 83–84. 
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Arguably, the justice system that existed in Rwanda before the genocide 
was little more than “a corrupt caricature of justice, and there was little to 
‘rebuild’”45 after the genocide, as the justice system had comprised about 
700 judges and magistrates, less than fifty of whom had any formal legal 
training.46  Thus, the Rwandan government requested that the United 
Nations help try those responsible for the genocide.47  In response, the 
United Nations Security Council created the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on November 8, 1994.48  However, the 
ICTR was designed to deal only with the masterminds of the genocide.49  
Without much of a court system of its own, Rwanda was thus left with 
few options for trials of the lower-level génocidaires50—criminals who 
participated in the genocide.51 
Meanwhile, the RPF, as the victors, endeavored to begin building a 
new country.52  By 2001, the government realized that the Belgian-
installed national judicial system was not working.53  First, the system 
could not handle the massive number of trials.  From 1997 to 2004, 
Rwandan civil courts dealt with only 10,026 cases54 of the 120,000 
suspects imprisoned.55  Second, formal criminal trials took wrongdoers 
away from their accusers.56  Moreover, the Rwandan cultural structures 
of family and community had not eroded, nor had the idea of gacaca 
justice.57  Thus, through the last decade, gacaca has been enacted, 
amended, and criticized but is ultimately proving to be a successful form 
of transitional justice for Rwanda. 
                                                     
 45. William A. Schabas, Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda: A Spectrum of Options, in AFTER 
GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN 
RWANDA AND BEYOND, supra note 1, at 207, 212. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 209. 
 48. Id. at 208. 
 49. See Nagy, supra note 23, at 92. 
 50. See Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 35. 
 51. Mark A. Drumbl, Lecture, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 41, 41 (2005). 
 52. Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 31. 
 53. See Nagy, supra note 23, at 87. 
 54. Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 45. 
 55. Nagy, supra note 23, at 87. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 35. 
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B. Gacaca Courts Today: “Inkiko Gacaca” 
Like the traditional gacaca system, Inkiko Gacaca—the “new” 
gacaca process—focuses on truth and reconciliation.58  The ultimate goal 
of this transitional justice system is to prevent a recurrence of genocide 
and allow the country to move forward through the use of 
reconciliation.59  The system encourages truthfulness in the form of 
confessions by allowing sentence reductions for those who confess.60  
Further, it takes justice to the people; anyone can make an accusation, 
and the accuser will have a chance to face the wrongdoer in a judicial 
process held in the community.61  A panel of judges then determines the 
person’s guilt.62  The process differs from traditional gacaca in that the 
new gacaca process is formally organized and recognized by the 
government63 and represents “a re-birth of a traditional Rwandan 
solution.”64  The rules are codified in the Rwandan Transitional National 
Assembly Organic Law 40/2000 of January 26, 2001.65  In this overview 
of the latest form of gacaca, the Comment will first give a brief timeline 
of Inkiko Gacaca and then examine the phases of the process.  Last, the 
Comment will discuss the gacaca sentencing guidelines. 
In 1999, the Rwandan government began an initiative to modernize 
and formalize the gacaca process.66  The new gacaca process has five 
goals: “establish the truth about what happened; accelerate the legal 
proceedings for those accused of genocide crimes; eradicate the culture 
of impunity; reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity; and use the 
capacities of Rwandan society to deal with its problems through a justice 
based on Rwandan custom.”67 
Also in 1999, the Kigali central prisoners’ gacaca commission began 
a campaign in the Kigali central prison to educate prisoners about the 
                                                     
 58. See id. at 38. 
 59. See Drumbl, supra note 51, at 48. 
 60. Nagy, supra note 23, at 94. 
 61. See id. at 93–94. 
 62. See id. at 94. 
 63. See JONES, supra note 22, at 8. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/1/2001 Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and 
Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against 
Humanity Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994 (2001) [hereinafter Organic 
Law No. 40/2000], available at http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/Law.pdf (amended in 2004 
and 2007). 
 66. Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
 67. Id. at 38. 
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gacaca process.68  As a result, about 1127 prisoners in that prison have 
confessed to various genocide-related crimes.69  Meanwhile, the 
government continued to expand and legitimize the process.  In October 
2001, Rwandans elected 260,000 gacaca judges70 based on their moral 
standing, integrity, and noninvolvement in the genocide.71  In June 2002, 
eighty pilot gacaca courts began operating.72  By December of that year, 
approximately 600 more courts were started.73  At this time, nineteen 
judges sat on each panel.74  The gacaca courts then took a break 
“intended to identify and correct weaknesses in the system.”75  Reforms 
in 2004 reduced the number of judges to nine on each panel and the 
overall number of judges to 169,400.76  Judges attended four days of 
training between November and December 2005 in anticipation of the 
start of gacaca courts nationwide in 2006.77  By April 2009, Rwanda 
operated approximately 12,013 gacaca courts, with 169,442 judges.78 
There are two phases of the gacaca process.  The first, information 
gathering,79 is complicated and time consuming.  In this phase, 
accusations, in the form of testimonials, are collected and validated.80  
This process often leads to new accusations, which also must be 
validated.81  At the end of the information collection, judges categorize 
suspects based on their alleged offenses.82  These categories are part of 
the 2004 gacaca reformation.83 
                                                     
 68. Sheena Kaliisa, Gacaca: Genocide Suspects Look Forward to New Justice System, 
INTERNEWS (Arusha), Oct. 6, 2001. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Julia Crawford, Hopes and Fears as Kigali Launches Participative Justice, HIRONDELLE 
NEWS AGENCY (Lausanne), Oct. 11, 2001. 
 71. Kaliisa, supra note 68. 
 72. High Turn Out as Gacaca Courts Open Nationwide, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY 
(Lausanne), Dec. 6, 2002. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Crawford, supra note 70. 
 75. Rwanda: Traditional Courts Inaugurated, UN INTEGRATED REG’L INFO. NETWORKS, June 
24, 2004. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Gacaca Volunteer Judges to Receive over 163 Million, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY 
(Lausanne), Jan. 24, 2006 [hereinafter Gacaca Volunteer Judges]. 
 78. 1994 Genocide—Gacaca Trials Discharge One Million Cases So Far, HIRONDELLE NEWS 
AGENCY (Lausanne), Apr. 6, 2009 [hereinafter 1994 Genocide]. 
 79. See Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 41. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 41–42. 
 82. Id. at 39, 42. 
 83. See id. at 39, 40 tbl.1(a). 
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There are three categories of criminals in the Rwandan justice 
system in reference to the genocide and the period between 1990 and 
1994.  Category-one offenders include rapists and those who occupied 
leadership positions.84  Category two has three subcategories, which are 
separated in terms of sentencing.  The first subcategory includes well-
known murderers, torturers, and persons who committed dehumanizing 
acts on a dead body.  The second subcategory covers ordinary killers and 
those who committed attacks with the intent of killing but were 
unsuccessful.  The third subcategory encompasses those who committed 
attacks without the intention to kill.85  Category three includes persons 
who engaged in property offenses.86 
The second phase of the gacaca process is the trial.87  Trials began 
nationwide in July 200688 and were scheduled to conclude in June 
2010.89  Depending on the offense category of the accused, trials are held 
at various administrative levels.90  The lowest and smallest 
administrative level is the cell, comparable to a neighborhood or small 
community.91  The next level is a sector, which “is like a small village 
and groups together several cells.”92  Trials for category-two offenses are 
held at the sector level, while category-three offenses are tried at the cell 
level.93  Category-one trials were held in the Rwandan civil courts until 
2008.94  At that time, the Rwandan government widened the jurisdiction 
of the gacaca courts to include some category-one offenses in an effort to 
dispose of the final cases in a timely manner.95 
The trials often take place in the accused person’s home village.96  
Judges read aloud the case file, which consists of the compiled 
testimonies from the accusers.97  The judges and community members 
also hear from the accused, from any accusers, and from any other 
                                                     
 84. Id. at 40 tbl.1(b). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 42. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Gacaca Closure Now Scheduled for June 30, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 12, 2010, 
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/13360/332/. 
 90. See Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 42, 43. 
 91. Id. at 41. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 42, 43. 
 94. See Sulah Nuwamanya, Gacaca Courts to Get More Powers, WKLY. OBSERVER (Kampala), 
Mar. 6, 2008. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 42. 
 97. Id. at 41, 42. 
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person who wishes to speak.98  Judges then “deliberate among 
themselves and [announce] the verdict in public.”99  Those convicted 
have the possibility of appeal; their case may be reviewed by a gacaca 
appeal court at the sector level composed of judges from the same 
locality.100  If it is a category-three property offense, there is an 
additional, alternative type of dispute resolution.  In these cases, the 
parties to the dispute are permitted to arrive at a “settlement related to the 
type and amount of restitution.”101  In this situation, the judges are 
present in a supervisory capacity and simply ratify the agreement if they 
find it appropriate.102 
Another important part of the gacaca system is sentencing.  Because 
the gacaca courts seek truth and reconciliation,103 confessions are taken 
into consideration in sentence determination.104  Confessing before 
appearing on a list of suspects reduces the sentence by even more time.105  
The most recent gacaca sentencing amendments were passed in March of 
2007.106  On July 25, 2007, Rwanda officially abolished the death 
penalty,107 thereby removing death from the sentencing possibilities for 
the worst offenders.108  Currently, category-one offenders—rapists and 
those who occupied leadership positions—can be given life 
imprisonment if they are found guilty and have not given a confession, 
twenty-five to thirty years if confessing after appearing on a list of 
suspects, and twenty to twenty-four years if they confess before 
appearing on the list.109 
Category-two offenders are the mid-level offenders with a wide 
range of crimes and sentences.  The first subcategory—well-known 
murderers, torturers, and persons who committed dehumanizing acts on a 
                                                     
 98. Id. at 42. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 43. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 38. 
 104. See High Turn Out as Gacaca Courts Open Nationwide, supra note 72. 
 105. See Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 40 tbl.1(b). 
 106. See Organic Law No. 10/2007 of 01/03/2007 Modifying and Complementing Organic Law 
No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 Establishing the Organisation, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca 
Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and Other 
Crimes Against Humanity, Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994 as 
Modified and Complemented to Date (2007) [hereinafter Organic Law 10/2007], available at 
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/L.O%20N%2010.2007%20VERSION%FINALE.pdf. 
 107. Rwanda Abolishes Death Penalty, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 26, 2007. 
 108. See Nuwamanya, supra note 94. 
 109. Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 40 tbl.1(b). 
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dead body—can be sentenced from thirty years to life in prison if they 
fail to give a confession, twenty-five to twenty-nine years if confessing 
after appearing on a list of suspects, and twenty to twenty-four years if 
confessing before that appearance.110  If a category-two offender 
confesses, the sentence is broken down: half is community service on 
probation, one-sixth is suspended, and one-third is served in custody.111  
Subcategory two—ordinary killers and those who committed attacks 
with the intention of killing but without actually doing so—are sentenced 
from fifteen to nineteen years without a confession, twelve to fourteen 
years for confessing after appearing on the list of suspects, and eight to 
eleven years for confessing before, with the same breakdown of the 
sentence for those who confess.112  The final subcategory—those who 
attacked others without the intention to kill—receives five to seven years 
without confession, three to four years if confessing after appearing on 
the list, and one to two years if confessing before appearance on the 
list.113  All of the sentences for offenders in this subcategory are broken 
down, whether or not they confess.114  Category-three offenders are not 
given prison sentences but must give civil reparations.115 
As of April 2009, the gacaca courts had completed 1.1 million 
cases,116 the vast majority of which were completed after the formal 
opening in 2005.117  Compare this figure to the civil justice system, 
which between 1997 and 2004 dealt with only 10,026 cases,118 and the 
ICTR, which as of April 2010 had completed only fifty trials.119 
C. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
The United Nations has engaged a different judicial format in 
pursuing perpetrators of genocide.  The United Nations Security Council, 
in an effort to “contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to 
                                                     
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. 1994 Genocide, supra note 78. 
 117. See Gacaca Closure Postponed One More Time, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 31, 
2010, http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/13340/332/. 
 118. Ingelaere, supra note 1, at 45. 
 119. Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor UNICTR & Under Sec’y-Gen., United Nations, 
Commemoration of 1994 Rwandan Genocide (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://69.94.11.53/ 
ENGLISH/speeches/jallow100407.htm. 
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the restoration and maintenance of peace [in Rwanda],”120 created the 
ICTR on November 8, 1994.121  The ICTR was established “For the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and 
other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring States, 
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December.”122 
The ICTR was largely a new idea at its formation and remains so 
today.  Only three important precedents exist for international 
prosecution: the post-World War II trials held in Nuremberg and Tokyo 
and, more recently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY),123 which was established only in 1993.124  When the 
ICTR formed, it met with criticism from the Rwandan government, 
whose officials were frustrated with the slow-moving United Nations 
bureaucracy and its aversion to capital punishment.125  The United 
Nations has taken great pains to ensure a fair trial process for those 
brought before the ICTR,126 and the focus of the tribunal has been 
decidedly more on retribution than on reconciliation.127 
In considering whether the gacaca courts are better suited to achieve 
the broad goals of transition and reparations, the ICTR is a useful 
comparison because it was established by non-Rwandans, on the other 
side of the globe, to address the same problem.128  The ICTR differs 
greatly in almost every way imaginable, including structure, form, 
sentencing, jurisdiction, and location.  However, a comparison of the two 
models proves beneficial to an analysis seeking the most effective mode 
of justice.  Perhaps, as will be discussed later, the ICTR could have 
increased its overall effectiveness in serving the Rwandan people if the 
United Nations had used a more cultural- and community-based model to 
form it. 
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The structure of the ICTR is basically the same as the ICTY 
model.129  There are three trials chambers and an appeals chamber, 
composed of sixteen judges, each a national from a different state.130  
Beyond this lies a massive bureaucracy of support staff and 
administrative groups.  There is the Office of the Prosecution, which 
includes the Prosecution Division and the Appeals and Legal Advisory 
Division.131  Next, there is the Registry, which “is responsible for the 
overall administration and management of the [ICTR].”132  The 
bureaucracy continues with Witness Support and Protection, which 
“ensure[s] the timely availability of witnesses by providing impartial 
support and protection services to all witnesses and victims called to 
testify” and includes both a defense and a prosecution section.133  There 
is the Defence Counsel and Detention Management Section to provide 
for “competent defence counsel to indigent accused/suspects detained 
under the authority of the ICTR and to ensure that the United Nations 
Detention Facility (UNDF) conforms with international standards.”134  
The Court Management Section contains approximately fifty employees 
that provide “administrative, judicial, and logistic support” to the 
Chamber proceedings, including court reporters and liaisons between the 
Chambers and Registry sections.135  Finally, the Procurement Section “is 
responsible for the procurement of goods and services” to the ICTR.136  
Compare this with Rwanda’s civil courts and the gacaca courts, and it is 
easy to see why there is criticism of the ICTR’s bureaucracy.137 
The ICTR has jurisdiction over those accused of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes; specifically, the ICTR tries those who were 
responsible for the genocide.138  The ICTR has concurrent but primary 
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jurisdiction, meaning that it may stay proceedings in Rwanda and order 
the accused to be transferred for prosecution.139  The accused are given 
full due process rights, including being informed of the nature of the 
charges, having adequate time to prepare a defense, and the right to an 
attorney.140  Failure in due process can result in dismissal of the 
indictment.141 
The ICTR is located in Arusha, Tanzania.142  It is a truly 
international affair—states participating in the arrest of suspects include 
Tanzania, Cameroon, Kenya, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, Togo, 
Zambia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, South 
Africa, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United States.143  
Because witnesses for the trials are often refugees hiding in other 
countries without valid traveling papers, various countries continuously 
assist them with documentation and travel.144  Additionally, members of 
the ICTR staff represent eighty different nationalities;145 and sentences 
for the convicted are enforced in places ranging from Mali, Benin, and 
Swaziland to France, Italy, and Sweden.146 
The first ICTR case began in 1997.147  Thus far, the ICTR has 
completed thirty-six cases, acquitted eight detainees, released two, has 
twenty-two cases currently in progress, eight more on appeal, and two 
more criminals detained and awaiting trial.148  Ten accused are still at 
large.149  For the 2010 and 2011 biennial budget, the ICTR had a United 
Nations approved gross budget of $245,295,800.150  In comparison, this 
figure represents approximately eighteen percent of Rwanda’s estimated 
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national expenditures in 2009.151  From its inception in 1994 until 2008, 
the ICTR has run at a total cost of approximately $1.1 billion.152 
III. ANALYSIS 
Thus far, the background discussion has illustrated the history of 
Rwanda and the cause of the genocide, the workings of the gacaca 
courts, and the workings of the ICTR.  At this point, the Comment 
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of both the gacaca courts and the 
ICTR in terms of transitional justice.  Next, it discusses how the gacaca 
courts are the more successful form of justice for the Rwandan people 
and represent a better cultural balance for the future use of transitional 
justice. 
A. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Gacaca Courts 
As previously mentioned, this Comment uses a broad definition of 
the term transitional justice.153  Transitional justice, by this definition, is 
interdisciplinary—it addresses numerous social areas and offers judicial 
approaches, which is exactly what the gacaca courts in Rwanda are 
doing.  Specifically, the gacaca court system offers economic, 
sociological, psychological, and cultural benefits.  Each of these areas 
overlaps with others, but for ease of dialogue, these aspects have been 
separated into categories. 
First, this Comment discusses the economic benefits of the gacaca 
system.  These include the cost, timeliness, and social drain of the prison 
population.  Second, this Comment examines the sociological and social 
relations that the gacaca courts successfully addressed.  These include 
the mindset of the perpetrator and the overall social goal of building a 
unified country.  Third, the Comment assesses the psychological benefits 
bestowed on both the victims and the accused.  Fourth, the Comment 
discusses the Rwandan cultural aspects that benefit from the gacaca 
courts.  Finally, the Comment analyzes the major weaknesses of the 
gacaca courts, which include procedural issues, procurement of suspects, 
court legitimacy problems, and lack of rights of the accused.  Overall, 
                                                     
 151. Rwanda’s estimated expenditures in 2009 total $1.392 billion.  The World Factbook: 
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this discussion leads to the conclusion that while the gacaca system is not 
perfect, it is an effective and useful method for transitional justice and 
dispute resolution.  With modifications, it could teach the rest of the 
world a more comprehensive approach to justice and serve as a model for 
future reconciliation-minded systems. 
1. Economic Benefits of the Gacaca System 
Economic advantages of the gacaca courts are somewhat more 
straightforward than the other categories.  Many of these are found by 
simply looking at the gacaca system and comparing it to trials held in the 
Rwandan criminal courts, which are more of a westernized institution.  
While gacaca trials give many economic advantages to the Rwandan 
people, there are also negative aspects that will be acknowledged. 
To begin with, it is important to look at the cost of the gacaca trials.  
The trials are held in the neighborhoods and communities where the 
offenses took place and are literally held on the grass.154  Compared with 
costs for traditional litigation, which include court costs, housing, 
utilities, and transportation, community-held trials have the potential to 
save the government enormous overhead cost. 
Additionally, the judges are paid low wages155 and initially were not 
paid at all.156  Without much financial benefit, the judges may well prefer 
working their fields to presiding over a gacaca court—making the low 
wages a point of argument against the effectiveness of the gacaca courts.  
Ultimately, however, the government does not have to pay high salaries 
for individuals with a high degree of legal training, and the judges are 
continuing their productive roles in their society. 
The gacaca trials omit the use of lawyers or other official paid 
representation for the accused in favor of allowing anyone to speak for 
the defendant.157  Failing to use official representation to defend the 
accused has negative aspects because due process rights, at least as 
recognized by a Western society, are basically nonexistent.  There is no 
one trained in the legal process to make arguments on behalf of the 
accused, to ensure he is receiving fair treatment from the court, or to 
explain exigent circumstances in which crimes may have occurred.  
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However, it is important to keep in mind that this is not a Western 
society and that this system was designed with other purposes in mind—
namely, that the people of Rwanda are recovering from crimes of 
catastrophic proportions and that they are traditionally a society of 
reconciliation.  If each accused had formal counsel, over one million 
attorneys would be needed.158  Counsel would need some kind of 
compensation and would have to come from somewhere.  Defense 
counsel might have to be brought from outside the community, causing 
mistrust amongst the villagers because the counsels are outsiders who are 
not accustomed to the system.  Otherwise, defense counsel would have to 
come from the village itself.  This would mean another person would be 
taken out of productive labor for the time of representation and would 
also probably have bias one way or another about the accused’s guilt or 
innocence. 
Additionally, it has been suggested that the “imposing presence of a 
lawyer would intimidate the gacaca judges.”159  While not a specifically 
economic factor, the system is dependent on the workings of the judges 
as community members to keep it afloat.  Taking this and the results of 
the actual trial process as a whole, it is certainly arguable that the people 
of Rwanda are using one of the most cost-effective ways to deliver 
justice to a massive amount of people. 
The next economic factor is timeliness.  If justice were delivered in 
the manner used in the first years after the genocide, it would have taken 
over a century to complete the trials.160  The slow-moving process, 
coupled with the above-mentioned costs associated with a more formal 
trial, including overhead costs and the need for people with a high level 
of legal training, would immensely drain the Rwandan economy. 
Closely related to the timeliness is the economic drain from the 
prison system.  Each person in prison costs the government money to 
house and feed.  In some areas, families bring meals to their accused and 
imprisoned family members.161  Bringing meals is a burden on those 
family members because it requires time and precious resources.  
Additionally, especially in an agricultural society, imprisoned individuals 
who may or may not be guilty of the crime they are accused of are not 
able to be productive members of society.  Able bodies that are not 
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working fields are, in essence, hurting the well-being of others and 
harming the country’s economy.  This is especially true in such a small 
country, and with well over 100,000 citizens imprisoned,162 there is a 
definite labor drain.  The gacaca system, in disposing of the cases 
quickly, allows those people who are innocent or are accused of crimes 
carrying a short prison sentence to return home and resume productivity.  
Additionally, the sentencing requirements that allow part of the sentence 
to be served on work-release parole163 are an extremely powerful 
advantage of the gacaca system.  Again, rather than finishing out their 
prison sentences in full, individuals are able to rejoin the community as 
productive members and reconcile their crimes by helping others. 
2. Sociological and Social-Relations Benefits of the Gacaca System 
Society benefits on macro and micro levels from the gacaca system 
and its ability to take into consideration certain sociological patterns of 
the génocidaires.  Anne Aghion, in her documentary Gacaca, Living 
Together in Rwanda?, examines the personalities of those accused of 
criminal acts during the genocide.164  Importantly, her film reveals that at 
least some of these people are conformists.165  They stay in prisons, even 
when security is minimal.166  They do things that are asked of them.167  
Interestingly, many of the accused at the gacaca level simply do not fit 
the mindset of killers.168  Basically, the people on the ground who 
committed acts of violence are generally not social deviants—in fact, 
they often want to be integrated and accepted in society169—which makes 
sense when considering that the social climate leading to the genocide 
was comprised of propaganda and brainwashing, in addition to general 
social unrest.170  When the higher power of government told them to go 
out and fix all their problems by committing acts of violence, they 
listened.171  The accused are remorseful, at least insofar as many confess 
to their crimes so they can apologize to their victims during the gacaca 
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court.172  Gacaca encourages this by allowing reduced sentences and 
earlier reintegration into Rwandan society for those who confess.173 
Another societal advantage is the use of gacaca to help reintegration 
of citizens as part of building a unified Rwanda.  The Rwandan 
Constitution no longer recognizes Hutu or Tutsi, eliminating these labels 
in favor of one “Rwandan” label.174  Part of building a unified Rwanda 
involves forgiving those who caused harm so they can come home and 
resume a useful place in society.  The open format of gacaca allows 
victims and transgressors to speak openly about wrongs committed in the 
hope of moving forward in unity.  Of course, forgiveness is easier said 
than done, especially following an event as catastrophic as genocide.  
Nevertheless, open forgiveness is something that the system is striving 
toward, and perhaps it is better to confront these issues now, as opposed 
to allowing the hurt to pass down through the generations as a form of 
blood feud. 
As part of building a unified Rwanda, gacaca has also given the 
citizens participatory justice and community involvement in the 
proceedings.  Individual community members, including victims, attend 
the gacaca courts to make accusations and hear the accused.175  The 
judges are members of the local community—they are not outsiders 
brought in to make judgments.176  This format creates an atmosphere of a 
community holding its members accountable for their wrongdoings, as 
the original gacaca did.  This makes it possible for the community to 
accept the outcome more readily. 
3. Psychological Benefits 
Conventional criminal law recognizes multiple theories of 
punishment, including deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and 
restitution.  All of these have an impact on both the individual criminal 
and other individuals in society, and gacaca imbibes them all.  
Psychologically, there is a huge deterrent effect from having one’s 
crimes known to the entire community and having to stand in front of 
them and either confess or try to refute the testimony.  Although the 
government is working hard to reunite Rwanda, the kind of pain that 
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arises from genocide is not likely to be forgotten—and so this court 
system stands not only as a deterrent for the criminals but also for others 
in the community.  In Rwandan culture, the family is still important and 
the community is an extension of the family.  Using the gacaca format 
discourages people from committing crimes because they may be called 
in front of their family to answer the accusations. 
In that same cultural context, there is also a retributive aspect.  
People do not want to be confronted with the worst acts they have 
committed, especially not by their victims.  Confrontation by one’s 
victim is certainly a form of punishment.  Additionally, the prison 
sentences impose a further retributive effect.  However, because the main 
goal of the government is to rebuild and unify the country,177 this is 
probably not a primary concern beyond a low level of retribution. 
Rehabilitation occurs when the prisoners are released back into their 
communities, among the people who accused them, to try and make a 
life.  The community as a whole is responsible for the rehabilitation.  
Restitution happens in much the same way—when the offender returns, 
he has to make amends to those who were hurt.  Laboring in their fields 
is one form of restitution; another form is monetary repayment for the 
level-three property offenses that are not punished with a prison 
sentence.178 
Beyond serving interests that are important in conventional criminal 
law, gacaca also helps the victims to carry on with their lives and forces 
the génocidaires to face their crimes.  Because the community is so 
heavily involved in every step of gacaca, from evidence gathering to 
communities assembled to hear charges, the community members are 
able to see those who wronged them and take an active role in the 
determination of their futures.  If closure is yet too difficult for the 
victims, at least they can begin the process of moving on. 
On the other side, the génocidaires are not left to themselves to 
harbor lingering feelings about the individuals they sought to hurt or 
eliminate.  They cannot detach themselves from the outside world and 
the victims because they are connected through the gacaca court.  
Undoing the damage done to Rwandan society through propaganda and 
brainwashing is not a simple task, but at the very least, the accused can 
begin to think of their accusers and the witnesses against them as people. 
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4. Rwandan Culture 
As already mentioned, one of the biggest benefits that gacaca 
bestows upon Rwanda is the unification of the country.  Unification, in 
essence, creates a new culture for Rwanda.  There are also parts of the 
traditional Rwandan culture that benefit from the gacaca courts more 
than they would benefit from Rwanda’s detached civil courts. 
First, gacaca is a system of justice Rwandans are comfortable with.  
Even though gacaca was pushed into a subservient position by the 
Belgian colonizers, it remained a part of the dispute-resolution system.179  
Using the new gacaca on a broad scale is in line with tradition, albeit 
with a slightly different form and function than original gacaca.  
However, it comes from the roots of Rwandan society and has the ability 
to restore a piece of culture that was almost lost in the colonization 
process. 
Next, the gacaca system brings opportunities for reconciliation.180  
One Rwandan adage reads: “In Rwanda we say . . . ‘The family that does 
not speak dies.’”181  In an Anne Aghion documentary of the same name, 
the film crew interviewed one man, Rwamfizi, a member of a Hutu night 
patrol who was accused of killing people in his village and has returned 
upon his release to await trial.182  Toward the end, the film crew brings 
Rwamfizi, his accusers, and other villagers to a bar, and it is the first 
time that they have sat down together since the genocide.183  Some of the 
women who lost all of their children have a difficult time, but others 
make the point that “[h]e was always a son of the family, and he remains 
so today,” and that they will try to bring him back in.184  The villagers 
and Rwamfizi begin to talk, to find ways to live together again.185  One 
point the people make is that mistrust is not good—people must learn to 
live together.186  Rwamfizi’s release from prison has given villagers the 
opportunity to do that by getting the accusations out in the open and 
allowing Rwamfizi to repair damaged relationships.187 
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“By speaking with [Rwamfizi], I understand better,” says his 
brother-in-law, a man whose mother, wife, and family were killed during 
the genocide.188  Rwamfizi replies: “Once what’s stuck in your throat 
passes, it’s a relief.  If we speak, it’ll end one day.”189  The brother-in-
law responds: “If you don’t say what you’ve seen, families remain 
mistrustful.  But when things are revealed, families turn to the future.”190 
These conversations show the importance of the gacaca message to 
the culture of the Rwandans.  The people want to know what happened to 
their loved ones by having the killers confess; they want the wrongdoer 
to apologize, to offer to work in their fields or fix their roofs.  Gacaca is 
giving the people a chance to have these conversations, to try and 
understand, without forcing them into the unhappy circumstance of far-
away proceedings that they cannot comprehend.  More importantly, 
gacaca is molded to their culture of community and openness. 
Finally, the process educates and shapes the next generation’s 
culture.  This is important today because it would be easy for hate to pass 
along and cast the next generation in a society of violence.  The Anne 
Aghion documentary mentioned above also goes into schools and listens 
to the children whose families were torn apart.191  The gacaca process 
seems to teach the next generation the lessons of unity and 
forgiveness.192  One child discussed the difficulty of knowing that “the 
killer is alive and well” while the victims’ families are dead.193  But, the 
child realized he could not think of that or the killing would start all 
over.194  “When the killer lives just opposite you, you cannot think of all 
that without feeling [the] need for revenge.”195  The younger generation 
is able to recognize that they must forgive196—and the reintegration of 
the génocidaires, while difficult, is necessary for continued survival.  The 
schools talk about the return of the perpetrators, the gacaca courts, and 
what the children’s reactions are, and it seems clear that they have 
listened to the gacaca messages of unity and forgiveness.197  Hopefully,  
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this is enough to keep any future violence from arising due to continuing 
feelings of mistrust or hate. 
5. Major Weaknesses of the Gacaca Courts 
In addition to the criticisms briefly mentioned as counterarguments 
above, numerous problems exist in the gacaca courts, many of which are 
documented and recognized not only by international critics but also by 
the government of Rwanda.  There are as many criticisms as praises for 
the gacaca courts, and both are limited only by the amount of creativity 
one has in looking at each aspect of the system.  For that reason, this 
Comment will discuss only a select few arguments.  First, this Comment 
will discuss various procedural difficulties, some of which are fairly 
unique to Rwanda.  Second, this Comment will examine the problem of 
accused génocidaires fleeing justice, both by fleeing to other countries 
and by hiding within Rwanda’s rural countryside.  Third, this Comment 
will evaluate the problems of court legitimacy.  Fourth, this Comment 
will address concerns regarding rights of the accused. 
The government of Rwanda, through the National Service of Gacaca 
Courts, has recognized some procedural difficulties they encountered in 
the information-collection phase.198  To begin with, the gacaca courts 
faced unique destruction-of-evidence problems because of the form of 
evidence collected and the informal environment.  For example, the 
“[d]estruction of notebooks where collected data was recorded or 
notebooks thrown into latrines” is one of a long list of information-
gathering problems. 199  Clearly, the collection of data represents unique 
challenges in a country that is predominantly rural and has an overall 
literacy rate of seventy percent.200  Re-collection of data because it was 
willfully destroyed and not stored in a more secure format or area is a 
waste of resources.  Moreover, lost data could be unrecoverable due to 
the unavailability of exact repetition. 
Along this same line, “[c]ollecting information from some specific 
areas . . . has often proved extremely difficult.”201  Without ready access 
to information and transportation, witnesses either do not know what is 
going on or do not have the capability to give testimony.  Without 
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witnesses to give evidence, gacaca cases against génocidaires cannot be 
made.  If these cases were tried in Rwanda’s civil courts, the courts 
would have more formalized, centralized processes, and government 
officials might be able to keep better track of information.  Centralized 
governmental resources might also be able to better reach into the 
problem areas to attain information and witnesses. 
Two other problems gacaca courts face are “[p]ersons going into 
exile allegedly because of Gacaca Courts whereas [sic] they actually flee 
justice” and “[p]ersons who moved from areas where they used to live 
during the genocide in [an] attempt to avoid being made accountable for 
the crimes they committed there.”202  People can disappear from even the 
most populated and technological places in the world to elude justice.  In 
Rwanda, where the country is small and rural, technology and 
information sharing can be minimal; if a person is able to escape the 
community or city, efforts to bring him to justice could prove futile.  
This problem has been somewhat remedied with the willingness of other 
countries to extradite génocidaires back to Rwanda to face trial, but 
clearly this applies only if the suspect is located and identified. 
Additionally, the gacaca courts have legitimacy problems.  
Specifically, “[a] quite big number of persons elected as 
Inyangamugayo . . . were later on recognized as having committed 
genocide.”203  The Inyangamugayo, or judges of the gacaca courts,204 are 
tasked with upholding the basic notions of justice.  If a judge’s integrity 
is compromised, it compromises the entire system.  After all, the gacaca 
courts focus on truth and reconciliation205—and if a judge cannot be 
trusted to take accountability, who should be?  At the local level, the 
victims harmed by the Inyangamugayo may have a difficult time 
allowing those who wronged them to give justice to others.206  On a 
collective scale, the untruthful Inyangamugayo undermine the legitimacy 
of the gacaca courts and the government that endorses them. 
Another legitimacy problem is that the Inyangamugayo have no legal 
training beyond a basic course on running the gacaca courts.207  
Upholding laws is a difficult task even for educated, lifelong attorneys 
and judges.  In Rwanda, the worst criminals in its history are being 
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brought to justice by those who have hardly any knowledge of the law.208  
Twenty years in prison is a long time and seems more unjust when 
handed down by a biased or unknowledgeable judge. 
The gacaca courts might also be at fault for allowing the populace to 
select judges based on the person’s reputation for integrity, without the 
availability of further information or any kind of oversight.209  As a 
counterargument, however, people arguably never know everything 
about their elected officials.  Allowing the people to choose who they 
want to administer justice in their court system is democratic and in line 
with the principle that the community ultimately holds wrongdoers 
accountable. 
Additionally, the gacaca courts cannot be held out as a legitimate 
justice system if they are not even accomplishing the goals of truth and 
reconciliation.  Mark Drumbl, a scholar who has spent a considerable 
amount of time studying and participating in the justice system in 
Rwanda, reports: 
[P]risoners who acknowledge that violence took place generally believe 
it was necessary out of self-defense.  These prisoners still do not 
perceive the 1994 massacres as manifestly illegal.  They see themselves 
as honorable citizens tasked to do the dirty work of furthering the 
interests of the state.  They do not deconstruct that state as 
fundamentally criminal.  These prisoners, even after years in jail, have 
not been disabused of the propaganda fed to them by extremist Hutu 
leaders, according to which the Tutsi were out to attack them, so, 
therefore, this attack had to be preempted by killing all the Tutsi.  This 
violence therefore is legitimized as a preemptive war of survival, not as 
genocide.  Unsurprisingly, then, many detainees see themselves as 
prisoners of war, simply ending up on the losing side.  With this in 
mind, they patiently wait for their side to regain power and then liberate 
them from prison.210 
If there is still some of this mindset existing in the minds of the accused, 
it is difficult to say how the gacaca system has served its truth and 
reconciliation purposes.  If these goals are not being served, it seriously 
limits the credibility of the system as a model for transitional justice. 
Yet another weakness of the gacaca system is the concern over the 
lack of due process rights of the accused.211  The main problem is that 
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there is so much incentive to confess to the charges that an individual 
may confess to crimes not committed to avoid a longer prison 
sentence.212  Another problem is that the speed at which the trials are 
conducted may not allow adequate time for a defendant to present his 
case or bring witnesses on his behalf.  Additionally, the lack of counsel 
to help the suspect make his decision to plea bargain, or at other critical 
stages of the proceedings, is a potential weakness.213  As a collective 
whole, this lack of due process rights is certainly something to be 
concerned about in the gacaca process.  The importance of universal 
human rights is certainly nothing to be disregarded—perhaps with 
certain safeguards, the gacaca court system could free itself of this issue 
while maintaining the important sense of community and reconciliation. 
One final weakness of the gacaca courts has come out over the 
course of the process—the government of Rwanda may interfere too 
much and undermine the courts’ legitimacy.214  As previously mentioned, 
the idea of gacaca is to allow justice to be served at the community level 
to allow the people a chance for reconciliation.215  When the process is 
subject to interference by a national government, the entire system is 
undermined.  Additionally, the Rwandan government has been accused 
of bringing false charges against political opponents for its own 
interests.216  If the government uses the gacaca system in this way, it 
would harm the overall legitimacy of the courts in the eyes of the 
Rwandan people, the international community’s view of the system, and 
the legitimacy of the government as a whole.  Furthermore, as the gacaca 
process has continued, the government has often coerced participation by 
“round[ing] up people for gacaca, and prevent[ing] them from 
leaving.”217  Forced participation severely undermines the rights of the 
individuals forced to participate and, importantly, takes the power of 
participation and justice away from the people it is supposed to serve. 
Again, these are only a few of the many problems of the gacaca 
courts.  There are countless additional meritorious arguments for why the 
gacaca courts are a failure of justice and a failure to human rights.  At 
least some of those arguments, however, fail to consider the historical, 
cultural, and situational context of the gacaca courts.  The atrocity of 
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genocide is an extremely rare event, and there is much to consider when 
deciding how to “best” help the hurt society. 
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda 
1. Benefits of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Many benefits exist in using the ICTR for prosecution of 
génocidaires.  The United Nations formed the ICTR with a well-defined 
structure and can amend it if the need arises.218  The ICTR embodies a 
high respect for rights of the accused,219 which may be critically lacking 
in the gacaca courts.220  The ICTR also provides a useful means to 
achieve certain goals, such as specific deterrence.221  There is also a 
chance for international involvement in the ICTR.222  As there is much 
criticism that the world stood by and merely watched during the 
genocide, perhaps this is helpful. 
First, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
as created and amended by various United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions, formally establishes the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
ICTR, the various chambers, provisions by which judges are to be 
assigned, their required qualifications, and their respective powers.223  
This creates an extremely organized and structured environment with 
accountability to other parts of the tribunal as well as the United Nations.  
Also, such a black-and-white document makes the function of the court 
well defined with little left in the cracks.  As seen by the document itself, 
numerous amendments to the Statute show that the United Nations has 
the capability to change pieces of the ICTR if the need arises.224 
Second, many procedural aspects of the ICTR help safeguard the 
rights of the accused, including stringent rules of procedure and 
evidence.225  These create a framework to which Western justice systems 
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can more readily relate.  They also arguably create a greater amount of 
legitimacy in verdicts because the means of prosecution are as important 
as the ends.  The procedures include a directive on the assignment of 
defense counsel226 and a code of professional conduct for defense 
counsel,227 both of which help further safeguard the rights of the accused.  
Related to this point, the creators of the ICTR were aware of the need for 
witness protection and witness rights, as these are also provided for in 
the Statute.228 
Third, it is important to note that the ICTR has achieved certain goals 
of a criminal justice system.  The ICTR has “contributed positively to the 
overall situation in Rwanda” by arresting, detaining, and convicting 
“many of the key figures responsible for the genocide,” which “presents 
an application of the concept of specific deterrence in that key offenders 
are no longer in a position to attempt to continue working towards their 
previous goals.”229  Keeping these key offenders out of play and 
punishing those who are found guilty, helps prevent a recurrence of 
genocide and helps eradicate the “culture of impunity,” which is one of 
the gacaca goals.230 
Finally, the ICTR is an international court, and many countries have 
lent support by arresting suspects, assisting with the travel of witnesses, 
and detaining those found guilty.231  This is an incredible strength—the 
support of the world community is invaluable to the success of an 
undertaking like the ICTR.  Developing this kind of support is not easy, 
and the support is truly an asset.  The Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda requires United Nations member-states to 
assist in investigations and prosecutions by complying with orders to 
identify, arrest, detain, and surrender suspects.232 
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The production of witnesses also proved difficult, as 
[m]any of the witnesses did not have valid legal status or documents in 
their countries of residence, often countries to which they had fled as 
refugees.  The challenge was to find a way to bring witnesses to Arusha 
to give testimony at trials and return them to their host countries.233 
This challenge was met with the production of necessary travel 
documents by multiple countries.234  Additionally, many witnesses in 
need of protective services were provided protection in the form of 
witness-support consultants and relocation assistance.235 
It must also be noted that the ICTR is teaching the international 
community a number of valuable lessons.  ICTR trials raise international 
awareness about the genocide in Rwanda.236  Additionally, the 
international community sets two important precedents through the 
ICTR.  First, persons who commit these kinds of crimes will be held 
accountable for them, possibly on a world stage—a kind of general 
deterrence.237  Second, a person can be “held accountable in his or her 
personal capacity with no exceptions based on the accused’s autonomy 
or activities in government.”238  Further, other international-justice 
institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, learn operational 
lessons and gain valuable, although not formally binding, 
jurisprudence.239 
2. Major Weaknesses of the ICTR 
There are several serious flaws of the ICTR that must be discussed.  
First, the ICTR has been unable to deliver justice to the people of 
Rwanda and has had serious issues with being a cost-effective entity.  
Second, the ICTR is too far removed from Rwandan life and works 
against—rather than with—the culture and the people of Rwanda.  
Finally, and possibly most importantly, the people and government of 
Rwanda do not support the ICTR and have not done so since its 
inception. 
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First, the ICTR has been inefficient in delivering any form of 
transitional justice desired for the Rwandan people.  There is a 
discontinuity in the stated mandate of the ICTR and the actual practice 
of its operations.  Although the mandate clearly indicates that the 
rebuilding of the Rwandan judicial system is one of the ICTR’s goals, 
there is little or no concrete evidence that would suggest that this 
aspect . . . has been meaningfully addressed.240 
In short, the ICTR seems to exist to help bring the high-level criminals to 
justice but is doing nothing else to further the future of Rwanda through 
reconciliation of the past or rebuilding of the society. 
Additionally, the ICTR has not delivered a high quantity of justice.  
The sheer weight of the numbers is impossible to ignore—since its 
inception, the ICTR has only completed thirty-six cases.241  Eight more 
cases are on appeal, eight people have been acquitted, and two 
individuals are awaiting trial.242  Thus, in over ten years, the ICTR has 
“disposed of” a grand total of fifty-two cases.  Conversely, the Rwandan 
gacaca courts have processed more than a million cases.243  The 
convictions at the international level cost more than $25 million each.244  
Without financial data on the gacaca courts, it is impossible to tell 
exactly how much each case costs, but it likely is substantially lower.  
Because the gacaca process has only just concluded in June 2010,245 
cumulative data is not yet available. 
Second, the ICTR is harmful to the people and the culture of Rwanda 
in several ways.  One of these ways is by taking the accused away from 
the people.  Rwanda has traditionally been a country where the family 
and community structure is important; the roots of gacaca show the 
importance of the individual as a part of the community.246  Within this 
culture, the person makes amends to those he has harmed, and the ICTR 
is taking that ability away.  These trials are being held in Arusha,247 
hundreds of miles away—an impossible distance for the rural, 
agricultural Rwandans to fathom.  “For the ordinary peasant the classical 
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tribunals are both physically and psychologically remote institutions.  
Although their thoughts on the ICTR may be partly mediated by the 
media reports and sensitization campaigns, they sincerely prefer the 
justice of proximity . . . .”248 
Additionally, it is only recently—October 27, 2009—that a strong 
initiative has begun to inform and educate the Rwandan people “about 
the role of [the] ICTR in contributing to the unity and national 
reconciliation process in Rwanda.”249  This project, called the Outreach 
Workshop, is a three-day workshop for secondary-school students and 
teachers, aiming to “enhance the youth awareness about ICTR 
achievements and challenges” and “promote the respect of human rights 
values and sharing of knowledge and best practices generated by the 
ICTR as part of its legacy in strengthening the unity and national 
reconciliation in Rwanda.”250  The late timing of this project leaves 
lingering questions about why it took the ICTR and the United Nations 
fifteen years to put a sorely needed program in place to educate the 
people of Rwanda about the ongoing efforts to bring génocidaires to 
justice, especially when those efforts occur outside their realm of 
understanding.  Whether the reason is bureaucracy, lack of resources, or 
something else, the point is that the ICTR or the United Nations could 
have recognized earlier that the tribunal’s removal from the people 
needed to be explained.  More fundamentally, perhaps the ICTR should 
have been structured differently from the outset to meet the needs of the 
population it is serving, especially considering that “[t]here is some 
indication that the more Rwandans learn of the ICTR’s work, the more 
inclined they are to view the institution more favorably.”251 
Additionally, the ICTR loses legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
because the punishment of the génocidaires convicted at the ICTR differs 
drastically from those convicted in Rwandan courts.252  The ICTR has a 
maximum penalty of life in prison while Rwandan courts “can issue 
death sentences.”253  This creates a proportionality problem because “the 
leaders of the genocide are punished less severely than lower level 
offenders.”254  Additionally, the prisoners serve out their sentences at 
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prisons away from Rwanda that have to be approved by the ICTR.255  
The conditions they live out their sentences in are far superior to the 
conditions in Rwandan prisons and villages,256 and they have the 
detached anonymity of being away from their victims and fellow 
Rwandans. 
C. Implications for the Future: Analyzing the End of the Gacaca Courts 
and Possible Improvements for Both Justice Systems 
Determining whether the gacaca courts or the ICTR have 
successfully delivered transitional justice is an issue of emerging 
importance and a complex policy debate.  The gacaca courts concluded 
in June 2010.257  It is thus likely that cumulative data will soon become 
available to assess the success of gacaca, as measured by the number of 
people held responsible for their crimes and the victims who were able to 
bring the perpetrators to justice.  In the years to come, it will become 
easier to study the after effects of the gacaca courts in accomplishing 
their goal of delivering transitional justice for the Rwandan people, 
though this is not measured quantitatively.  At this unique time in their 
history, Rwandans may be able to show the rest of the world that their 
chosen system of justice merits close study for the future of conflict 
resolution as a more comprehensive approach to justice than a divisive 
justice system.  This Comment argues that a future for such a 
reconciliatory system is possible, as shown by the gacaca courts’ various 
positive accomplishments, while at the same time noting a few critical 
changes that could be made to ensure the future success of a similar 
system.  The ICTR model is also useful.  Although it has not experienced 
the same amount of widespread success, it is an example of what kind of 
response the international community is capable of producing.  By 
integrating certain gacaca concepts, the ICTR could prove to be another 
tool for dispute resolution. 
The gacaca courts, as shown above, meet several important needs—
economic, sociological, psychological, and cultural—for the Rwandan 
people.258  Gacaca also meets the definition of transitional justice as used 
in this Comment—there was a period of political change as Rwanda 
moved toward democracy, there was a legal response to a past regime, 
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gacaca worked towards rebuilding a framework of society by meeting the 
aforementioned needs, and gacaca reconstructed the conditions for a 
functioning peacetime society by allowing the truth to be brought forth 
and reconciliation to occur between the offenders and victims.  The 
school scene in the Anne Aghion documentary, In Rwanda We Say . . . 
The Family that Does Not Speak Dies, shows that the country is on its 
way toward building a better future in the coming generations.259 
Therefore, the gacaca process should be praised not only for what it 
has done for Rwanda but also for the potential the process has for other 
societies in today’s ever-evolving world of government and politics.  The 
ICTR is also educational because it shows that even the best-intended 
plans can fail to meet the needs of society.  With a few adjustments, 
however, the ICTR could potentially cater to the needs of the Rwandan 
people. 
1. Potential Improvements to the Gacaca Courts 
The gacaca courts need to improve certain features to gain more 
legitimacy in the world at large and make other countries more willing to 
cooperate with the needs of the people.  Improvements for the gacaca 
courts would be important if they are to be used again, either in Rwanda 
or as a similar transitional- or reconciliation-justice model elsewhere.  
The gacaca courts could be improved in one key way—by making sure 
the trial process is as fair as possible.  This could be achieved by more 
carefully screening and educating judges, improving witness protection, 
and employing additional due process protections. 
Education and screening of judges is a key improvement in either a 
continued use of the gacaca courts or in any community-based justice 
approach.  Education about legal consequences is important, but it is a 
challenge made more difficult in Rwanda because around thirty percent 
of the country’s population is illiterate.260  The solution to this problem is 
difficult.  On the one hand, it is extremely difficult to allow a judge to sit 
when unable to read or write about the charges or decision; on the other 
hand, forcing a literacy requirement on judges would ruin the collective-
representative approach of participatory, community-based justice.  
Perhaps the best solution involves giving judges more than the absolute 
minimum legal training and including some reading and writing 
education in the process.  Alternatively, a neutral third party could be 
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retained as a reader and recorder.  Although further education would 
require additional resources and time before trials began, this appears as 
the easiest way to patch a serious flaw in the system.  More careful 
screening of judges is also important, as many Inyangamugayo have 
been recognized as génocidaires.261  Clearly, being accused of the same 
crimes as the people they are judging is a serious challenge to the 
legitimacy of the system. 
Witness protection could be a way for the government to ensure 
further willing participation.  With the release of prisoners from pretrial 
confinement, it is possible that they—or a family member or friend—
would attempt to coerce any witnesses against them into not testifying or 
retracting their statements.262  Without these witnesses to give testimony, 
the gacaca system fails.  Government assistance in protecting witnesses 
could involve the assignment of security personnel to the village, 
relocation of the prisoner, relocation of the witness into a nearby village, 
or simply maintaining strict confidentiality of the identities of the 
accusers until the trial.  However, if the person is guilty and knows the 
identities of victims or their survivors, confidentiality may not work.  
Likewise, witness relocation is difficult because Rwanda is such a 
family- and agriculture-based society and many people are probably less 
willing to move away from their land and community.  A solution, 
therefore, is not easy.  However, this is a flaw recognized by the 
Rwandan government—President Paul Kagame has tried to “‘put in 
place penalties for those who interfere and try to manipulate gacaca 
proceedings.’”263  Perhaps the threat of further prison time or economic 
penalties could work, but there is no evidence whether this threat of 
penalties has been successful.264  Ideally, the goals of truth and 
reconciliation would protect the parties from harming one another and 
allow reintegration into the community, but this is probably too 
idealistic.  Thus, the issue of witness protection could continue to create 
problems for this type of justice system. 
Due-process improvements are also needed for the success of the 
gacaca courts.  Although the gacaca courts are being utilized in a manner 
that is partially geared towards expediting the process of bringing so 
many accused to justice, it must not pressure innocent people to confess.  
In keeping with the cultural ideal of truthfulness, it is important not to 
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discourage those who confess to their crimes, but it is also unfair for an 
accused to falsely confess for fear of receiving a worse sentence.  A 
solution to this problem is somewhat tricky, as a country such as Rwanda 
that has been decimated by genocide will have to determine “which 
rights it can and will protect given its” still-scarce resources.265  One first 
step would probably involve an appeals system that would allow those 
who feel they are innocent to have their case reheard. 
Another concern in the area of due process is based on the low 
literacy rate of the Rwandan people.266  The accused might not be aware 
of the process in any certain terms and thus might not be able to speak on 
his own behalf.  Depending on the context in which the gacaca model is 
to be used, perhaps accused individuals should be given further 
education about their crimes specifically.  It would also be helpful to 
give the accused a representative, acting as somewhat of a defense 
attorney, to help explain the accused’s options and the court process.  
Another option, which would keep the idea of community involvement 
alive, would involve using a third party as a mediator to allow the 
accused and his accuser to discuss the charges and, after conviction, to 
determine some way to reach a level of reconciliation. 
2. Potential Improvements to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda 
The ICTR, and international tribunals of the future, could be 
improved in one seemingly simple way—by working with the existing 
and deep-rooted cultural aspects already in place, which would lend 
legitimacy by being more readily identifiable to the people.  A better 
effort could be made to involve the country in the system, both in terms 
of physical proximity and in tailoring the process to the educational 
needs of the country.  This change would improve the ICTR by lending it 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Rwandan people without dispensing of the 
important support of the global community. 
The simple and obvious improvement in the formation of the ICTR 
would have involved working with the existing culture of Rwanda.  The 
ICTR could have accomplished this in three ways.  First, the ICTR could 
have incorporated more of the local tradition—in this case, to take justice 
to the people in a community-oriented fashion.  Second, the ICTR could  
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have involved the everyday people in at least some aspects of the court.  
Third, the ICTR could have used a more accessible location. 
Although there are shortcomings to the gacaca court process, it 
ultimately proves to be the more useful tool of transitional justice for the 
Rwandan people because of the failure of the ICTR to take local 
traditions into consideration.  Perhaps an integrated approach to 
transitional justice would be better.  As reported by Rosemary Nagy, “the 
UN secretary-general writes in his report on transitional justice, ‘due 
regard must be given to indigenous and informal traditions for 
administering justice or settling disputes,’ and this must be done ‘in 
conformity with both international standards and local tradition.’”267  
This balance in transitional justice between being “effective and 
legitimate, locally forged and consonant with the respect owed to all 
human beings, is a growing and pressing challenge in the field of 
transitional justice.”268  The ICTR could have striven more towards 
conformity with local tradition by focusing on reconciliation rather than 
punishment and by giving community members a voice in the 
proceedings.  Additionally, educational outreach and locality, discussed 
next, would have lent the ICTR further power to act as a transitional-
justice authority. 
Education could have been used from the beginning to connect the 
Rwandan people to the ICTR.  The Outreach Workshop should have 
been started years before its actual inception in 2009.269  This would 
have, at the very least, explained the role of the ICTR, how it works, and 
why the people are not seeing the effects of the court system.  Further 
involvement for the Rwandan people in the ICTR could have come in the 
form of regular reports and updates or through employment at the ICTR.  
Regular updates on radio, in print, or in the form of ICTR outreach 
personnel dispatched to the countryside, could have at least helped the 
Rwandan people feel informed of the stages of the process, which is 
especially important because they are not able to be physically present to 
look into the eyes of the people who masterminded the vicious genocide 
and caused the country so much pain.  The realization that the Rwandan 
culture is one of reconciliation explains the need for the involvement of 
the people to achieve this goal.  If the ICTR had employed Rwandans in 
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some small way, it would have given those persons, and by extension 
their communities, a glimpse of their participatory way. 
Physical relocation of the ICTR could have worked as well.  Arusha, 
Tanzania, is an insurmountable distance for people who have so few 
means.  If the ICTR, at the least, held court somewhere in Rwanda, more 
Rwandans would likely have been able to travel to watch.  This could 
also address some of the criticisms of the ICTR’s immense costs;270 at 
least the money would have a far better chance of reaching the Rwandan 
economy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the problems of the gacaca courts, they have proven to be a 
successful form of transitional justice for the Rwandan people.  The 
ICTR, though a valiant effort by the global community, is simply too far 
removed from society and too caught up in its own bureaucracy to make 
the kind of impact that gacaca has made.  As the gacaca system winds up 
and its results become known, it will serve as a useful model on which to 
base future transitional-justice systems and could perhaps revolutionize 
the ways in which the world views legal systems.  A successful, 
comprehensive approach to helping people and communities move 
beyond problems cannot be overlooked. 
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